South Africa's "Right Track" land reform? RECAP's efforts to resuscitate land reform projects in distress by Anseeuw, Ward
52nd AEASA conference  
« 20 years on since Democracy – Quo vadis? » 
28/9 – 1/10/2014  
 
South Africa’s “Right Track” Land Reform? 
RECAP’s efforts to resuscitate land reform projects in distress 
Ward Anseeuw  
University of Pretoria / CIRAD  
 
Abstract: 
Although South Africa’s land reform programme has achieved some progress in terms of 
improving access to land and contributing to improved livelihood for beneficiaries, its 
sustainability has been questioned, both within and outside government circles. In particular, 
some of the transferred farms have not reached the desired levels of productivity while others 
are not operational at all (Kirsten and Machethe, 2005; Anseeuw, 2012). It was partly as a 
result of the above that the Recapitalisation and Development Programme (RADP) was 
introduced in 2010, promoting recapitalisation of land reform farms and links with strategic 
partners. On request of the Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), a 
mid-term evaluation was undertaken to assess the programme’s implementation progress and 
intermediary results. This paper aims at presenting the results of this evaluation exercise. Based 
on extensive fieldwork and the implementation of a participatory M&E in 6 provinces, the results 
show that progress has been made regarding land reform, particularly from a socio-economic 
point of view. Production is increasing, market access has improved and social determinants 
such as social well-being and food security are on the rise. However, the strategic partnership 
model implemented questions effective empowerment of emerging farmers. 
 
 
 
Although South Africa’s land reform programme has achieved some progress in terms of 
improving access to land and contributing to improved livelihood for beneficiaries, its 
sustainability has been questioned, both within and outside government circles. In particular, 
some of the transferred farms have not reached the desired levels of productivity while others are 
not operational at all (Kirsten and Machethe, 2005; Anseeuw, 2012). 
 
According to CDE (2008) and Anseeuw et Mathebula (2008), there are five types of recurring 
problems, mainly related to pre- and post-settlement support as well as to structural aspects of 
South Africa’s land reform programme: 1) the non-feasibility and the non-viability of land 
reform projects (too many beneficiaries on farms that are too small, remote and lacking basic 
rural and agricultural infrastructure); 2) ill-adapted institutional structures (non-recognition of 
legal entities – grouping together numerous beneficiaries – and land tenure); 3) nonexistent 
collective action and institutional isolation (many beneficiaries find themselves isolated with no 
(public) support whatsoever after the land transfer operation); 4) insufficient and ill-adapted 
support measures (which are still tailored for and based on a “(white) large-scale commercial 
agriculture” model); 5) a cumbersome and inefficient administration that lacks transparency (in 
some areas, beneficiaries can wait up to eight years to get their title deed and then effectively 
access and start investing on their land). 
 
It was partly as a result of the above that the Recapitalisation and Development Programme 
(RADP) was introduced in 2010. The programme was designed to focus on struggling land 
reform farms acquired since 1994 that have received little or no (post-settlement) support, but 
have potential to become successful, if assisted. As such, it has five objectives: (a) to increase 
agricultural production; (b) to guarantee food security; (c) to graduate small farmers into 
commercial farmers; (d) to create employment opportunities in the agricultural sector; and (e) to 
establish rural development monitors. In order to do so, distressed farms are supposed to receive 
both technical and financial support from government (Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform, 2012a), while they are requested, in order to ensure sustainability of assisted 
projects/farms, to enter into a partnership with a strategic partner and mentor. The RADP would 
reach these objectives through a two-fold programme: on one hand, it would recapitalise 
‘distressed’ land reform farms; on the other hand, recapitalised farms would benefit from 
development measures, such as human capacity development and skills transfer mainly related to 
a mentorship model (box 1). 
 
Box 1: the Recapitalisation and Development Programme (Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform, 2012a) 
 
The RADP programme consists of two major axes: Recapitalization and development. 
 
1) Recapitalisation 
 
The recapitalisation aspect focuses on the funding of the business elements of the project, how to 
nurture the enterprise to become profitable and sustainable based on a business plan. Essentially, 
it involves restructuring the farm’s debt and equity mixture, most often with the aim of making 
the farm’s capital structure more stable. It is based on a 5 phase funding model: 
a) Phase 1: 100% funding for infrastructure and operational costs; 
b) Phase 2: 80% funding for development needs; 
c) Phase 3: 60% funding for development needs; 
d) Phase 4: 40% funding for development needs; and 
e) Phase 5: 20% funding for development needs. 
The funding shortfall from Phase 2 onward is to be derived from proceeds of the relevant 
preceding phase. It is envisaged that for the first five years and more (for longer term 
investments) the DRDLR would play an instrumental role in overseeing the management of the 
projects. In some instances the DRDLR may serve on the board of managing directors. In 
relation to the above model it means that by year 6, the business would not require any funding 
from the Department and has become self-sustaining.  
 
2) Development 
 
The development function focuses on the human development and actual physical development 
of the farming enterprise. This includes appointment of mentors or strategic partners, as well as 
other on-farm capacity building initiatives. Other government Departments, including 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) has a central role to play as 
development partners.  
 
* Mentorship  
The mentorship programme aims to equip the mentee with training, marketing, finance, 
networking and other farm related skills, to ensure that the mentee can start producing, enter 
markets and create successful farms and enterprises.  Mentorship would become a central 
element of the programme given the skills gap of land reform beneficiaries. Not all projects 
would require a mentor. 
 
Mentors (accredited by the PRADAC and approved by the NARADAC ) are appointed and 
expected to equip land reform beneficiaries, with the necessary skills to run successful 
enterprises. Different mentors would be assigned to different projects in accordance with their 
skills and knowledge over an agreed period. The costs of mentorship are expected to be covered 
by the enterprise once it has started generating a profit. As such, the RADP would only fund the 
expenses of a mentor for 12 months or until the end of the first production cycle if the latter is 
longer than 12 months.  
 
* Strategic Partnerships 
Strategic partners (SP) can be companies or individuals which, in addition to mentor the land 
reform beneficiaries, are investing in the land reform project. As such, the most important 
element of a strategic partnership is risk sharing, which implies capital investment in the project 
that does not encumber the land (therefore restricted to production loans where necessary), 
sharing or user agreements in relation to assets of both partners (beneficiary and strategic 
partner) and general accountability in terms of the business operations. 
 
Strategic partnerships can include: besides mentorship (see above), contract farming, co-
management and share equity schemes. The remuneration of SPs will be dependent on the type 
of contract they enter into with the Department and farmers. This may include a profit-sharing 
arrangement or a specific fee for services rendered. 
 
In many cases both Recapitalization and Development will be required to achieve the objectives 
of projects’ business plans. 
 
Since its implementation in 2010, 1807 distressed farms have been targeted, of which about 640 
have been implemented, for recapitalisation and development (Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform, 2012a). Out of the 640 farms (530 934 ha) placed under the 
RADP: 264 are attached to strategic partners, 117 to mentors, most of the remaining 259 farms 
are being considered for direct sourcing as there are no interested/adapted mentors/strategic 
partners yet. About 38 strategic partners and 50 mentors have been appointed thus far 
(Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2012a). 
 
On request of the Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), a mid-term 
evaluation was undertaken to assess the programme’s implementation progress and intermediary 
results. This paper aims at presenting the results of this evaluation exercise. A first section will 
present the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) exercise by detailing the questions raised and the 
methodology implemented. The second section will present the results of the M&E by putting to 
the fore the progress made as well as analysing its issues and obstacles, discussing the latter in 
light of the evaluation questions raised. While discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
RADP programme, the concluding section will reflects on whether South Africa has engaged a 
right track regarding its land reform programme. 
 
RADP’s evaluation design and methodology – The implementation of participatory and 
applied M&E 
 
The RADP is to be implemented over a five-year period from 2010 to 2014. This means that the 
programme is now more than half way into the five-year period. Hence, a mid-term review of the 
programme was commissioned. In particular, the evaluation was to focus on addressing the 
following mid-term evaluation questions:  
(i) Are the two interventions (strategic partnerships and mentorship) effective in 
developing the projects? 
(ii) Does the RADP effectively develop the intended beneficiaries to participate in 
commercial production? 
(iii) Is the RADP reaching its targeted beneficiaries? 
(iv) Was the RADP designed appropriately for the achievement of its objectives? 
(v) Are the resources used efficiently? Is value for money being obtained? 
(vi) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the RADP in achieving its objectives in 
relation to the technical competencies of the various stakeholders? 
(vii) How can the RADP be strengthened? 
(viii) Is the RADP project cycle aligned to the farming operations? 
(ix) Are the intended objectives of the RADP being achieved or likely to be achieved? 
(x) Is there a common understanding of the RADP among all stakeholders? 
To address the above questions, the evaluation was based on a partnership approach to 
evaluation, in which - being participatory and applied in nature - stakeholders actively engage in 
developing the evaluation (Institute of Development Studies, 1998). Those who have the most at 
stake in the programme — partners, programme beneficiaries, funders and key decision makers 
— play active roles. Participation occurred throughout the evaluation process, including 
identifying relevant questions, planning the evaluation design, selecting appropriate measures 
and data collection methods, and discussing findings, conclusions and recommendations. As 
such, the implemented participatory and applied evaluation in the framework of this RADP 
evaluation was about sharing knowledge with relevant stakeholders, building (evaluation) skills 
of programme implementers, as well as considering the perspectives, voices, preferences and 
decisions of a wide range of stakeholders engaged in the RADP programme. Through this 
process, participants could influence the evaluation’s focus and set certain criteria and 
thresholds, within their own socio-economic (for the beneficiaries) and institutional (for the 
programme implementers) environments. Concretely, it allowed for (1) the identification of 
locally relevant evaluation questions; (2) assessment programme performance at all levels as it is 
reflective and action-oriented; (3) empowerment of participants and capacity building 
(stakeholders were included in the different phases of design and implementation), development 
of commitment through collaborative inquiry. The process resulted in an evaluation that was 
transdisciplinary (not only focused on economic and financial aspects of land reform/RADP, but 
also included aspects such as social status, food security, economic well-being, etc.) as well as 
increased political intent in accountability, performance, and indicators and transparency. 
 
The evaluation was to be country-wide, implying the necessity of a representative sampling. 
Stratified sampling and purposive sampling were used to select the projects and respondents, 
ensuring that projects from each sub-group are included in the final sample. The following 
criteria were used to select the projects:  
(i) Geographic distribution to ensure that regional climatic variations are taken into 
consideration and both urban and rural areas are included. 
(ii) Type of enterprise to ensure that both livestock and crop projects are included. 
(iii) Size of project to ensure that small and large projects are included in the sample. 
(iv) Stage of project to ensure that projects in all stages (planning, implementation and 
production) are included. 
(v) Project performance to include both successful and failed projects. 
(vi) Strategic initiative to include projects with and without a strategic partner/mentor. 
(vii) Number of RADP projects per province to ensure that provinces with large and 
reasonably small number of projects are included. 
(viii) Type of land reform program (SLAG, LRAD, SLAG, PLAS, Commonage, and 
Restitution). 
(ix) Type of strategic partner/mentor to include the various types of strategic 
partners/mentors. 
Based on the above sampling methodology and criteria, the following provinces were selected 
for fieldwork: Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and North West. A 
total of 100 from the 640 projects that were identified as recapitalised by DRDLR were included 
in the initial sample (Table 1). However, due to several inconsistencies (mainly related to official 
figures not corresponding to the concrete activities on the ground, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal 
and Free State), led to some adjustments to the number of projects initially selected and resulted 
in the sample being reduced to 98 projects (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Projects selected and visited by province  
 
Province RADP farms per 
province 
Number of projects 
selected initially 
Number of 
projects visited 
Gauteng 51 10 10 
Eastern Cape 71 9 9 
Limpopo 72 13 13 
Free State 70 25 22 
KwaZulu-Natal 118 23 24 
North West 79 20 20 
Total 461 100 98 
 
For each project selected, the various categories of stakeholders were interviewed/assessed, 
through the implementation of a different data collection instrument. A total of 176 interviews 
were conducted: 
a) Project/farm management (98 interviewed): A structured questionnaire was administered 
to the management (beneficiaries) of the farms/projects.  
b) Focus Groups (beneficiaries other than project managers – 11 realized): A checklist 
was used in cases where, in addition to the project manager, there were other beneficiaries.  
c) Strategic partners and mentors (26 interviewed): Interviews with strategic partners and 
mentors were conducted using a checklist. 
d) Project officers (26 interviewed): DRDLR officials responsible for RADP project 
facilitation and coordination with strategic partners and mentors were interviewed using a 
checklist. 
e) Provincial leadership (provincial government officials – 14 interviewed): A checklist 
was used for interviews with DRDLR provincial managers (Directors and Deputy 
Directors) responsible for land reform and RADP.  
f) National leadership (national government officials – 1 interview): A DRDLR official 
(Director) at the national level responsible for RADP was interviewed using a checklist. 
 
Data processing was implemented according to two modalities. Firstly, in-depth project 
questionnaires were analysed through descriptive quantitative analyses, using Excel (and SPSS 
where necessary). Secondly, data gathered from the other interview instruments (key informant 
interviews, focus groups) were analysed qualitatively. This was done manually, without any 
statistical tool.  
 
Results – RADP’s relative positive results, leaving room for improvement 
• RADP - Promoting a commercial farm model 
The RADP programme focuses on projects representing viable economic entities (based on 
business plans, developed with the help of the strategic partners/mentors and approved by RADP 
agents at DRDLR national office) with few beneficiaries, with activities mainly oriented for 
market production. As such RADP is a continuation of the farming model supported since the 
LRAD and subsequent PLAS programmes. This also explains why the large majority of farms 
benefiting from the RADP programme are PLAS farms (out of the 98 projects assessed in the 
framework of this project 45 (46%) are PLAS, 38 redistribution LRAD, 7 redistribution 
SLAG/equity-share, 7 private transaction/other). 
 
As such, the average size of the farms selected for RADP is 672 ha, with the smallest ones 
(either horticultural or poultry ones) in Gauteng (Table 2). The total number of beneficiaries 
directly benefiting from the land reform projects benefiting from RADP is relatively low. In 
total, based on the 98 projects evaluated, 670 people are benefiting from it. This is less than 7 
direct beneficiaries per project. (these figures do not take into consideration the dependents of 
these beneficiaries). Out of these 670 beneficiaries, 42% are full-time and 58% are part-time; 
with 71% of the projects having at least one full-time beneficiary. 
 
  
Table 2: Size of farms benefitting from RADP (in ha) 
 
Eastern 
Cape 
Free State Gauteng KZN Limpopo North West Total 
général 
Average 1742,3 901,8 200,4 394,2 249,2 823,9 672,2 
Max 12215,0 2310,0 623,0 2296,0 937,0 3900,0 12215,0 
Min 24,0 19,0 2,7 40,0 5,1 12,4 2,7 
St deviation 4247,7 621,0 230,7 514,4 303,0 1107,4 1390,8 
 
• Increased production and positive social impacts 
The effectiveness of RADP in developing beneficiaries to participate in commercial production 
can be assessed in terms of the number of beneficiaries/farms ready to participate or already 
participating in commercial production. In all six provinces, there was general consensus among 
government officials that, although RADP had not yet produced commercial farmers, many of 
the beneficiaries were on their way to becoming commercial farmers. The view that RADP has 
produced commercial farmers was held by some strategic partners/mentors, mainly in the Free 
State (livestock projects) and KwaZulu-Natal (sugar cane sector).  
 
A positive aspect of RADP is that farming operations are on-going on 69 of the 98 projects 
included in the review. This alone is a great achievement considering the relatively large number 
of land reform projects that were found to be non-operational in previous evaluations of land 
reform projects in the country (Kirsten and Machethe, 2005; Anseeuw and Mathebula, 2008). 
Furthermore, both crop and livestock production has increased after RADP was implemented on 
the farms. 
As such, although 29 out of the 98 projects (29.6%) still have a turnover of zero, the turnover on 
the RADP farms covered in the study is, on average, R1.45 million when all RADP beneficiaries 
are considered (Table 3 and Figure 1). The average turnover increases to R2.05 million per 
project when only producing farms are considered. Gauteng farms have the lowest turnover of 
R188,120 per project overall or R268,743 when producing farms are considered. North West has 
the highest turnover of R2.40 million per project or R3.92 million for producing farms. 
 
Table 3: Production in turnover on RADP farms (000 Rand) 
 
Eastern 
Cape Free State Gauteng KZN Limpopo North-West 
Total 
Average total 
 
531 1 192 188 1 380  2 409 2 221 1 446 
Average 
producing farmers 
796 2 184 268 1 840  3 915 2 468 2 054 
Standard 
deviation 
1 189  3 639 310 1 619  8 363 6 732 4 653 
Minimum 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 
 
3 615 17 100 918 5 180 30 240 28 788 30 240 
Sum 
 
4 778 26 213 1 881 33 113  31 324 44 436 141 745 
 
Overall, agricultural production has increased on the RADP farms covered in the study, 
compared to the production levels when the farms were acquired (Table 4). For livestock, the 
increase in herd size has continued after acquisition of the farm; with RADP adding to the 
already increasing stock numbers (many of the beneficiaries already had livestock, mainly on 
communal land) (Table 4). Crop production, on the other hand, experienced a slow-down (a drop 
in some provinces, such as the Free State) soon after acquisition of the farms. This decreasing 
trend has been addressed through RADP, resulting in significant increases in production in later 
years (Figure 2). 
Table 4: Evolution of production on RADP farms interviewed 
 
 At acquisition Before RADP After RADP At present 
Total Livestock numbers* 
 1 735 3 631 4 482 10 398 
Total Area under crop production 
 1 958 ha 1 938 ha 3 050 ha 8 641 ha 
* = Only large and small stock included  
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of production on the RADP farms 
 
• Positive social-economic impacts 
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Overall, the evaluation shows that RADP has achieved some significant results (although for 
some categories and in specific provinces important improvements can/should be made) (Table 
5). 
 
Table 5: Impact assessment of RADP, according to different fields 
 
Eastern 
Cape 
Free 
State Gauteng KZN Limpopo 
North-
West Total 
Since RADP, has market access been easier?  
 
N – Improved market access 
4 12 4 7 5 11 43 
% of respondents to question/effective 
beneficiaries of RADP 
42,86 42,86 0,00 70,83 58,33 15,38 46,91 
% of total interviewees 
33,33 40,91 0,00 70,83 53,85 10,00 38,78 
Since RADP, did your economic situation 
change?     
 
  
N – Improved economic situation 
6 11 2 18 9 10 56 
% of respondents to question/effective 
beneficiaries of RADP 
85,71 52,38 66,67 81,82 75,00 76,92 71,79 
% of total interviewees 
66,67 50,00 20,00 75,00 69,23 50,00 57,14 
Since RADP, did your social status change? 
     
  
N – Improved social status 
6 11 2 17 8 10 54 
% of respondents to question/effective 
beneficiaries of RADP 
85,71 55,00 66,67 77,27 66,67 76,92 70,13 
% of total interviewees 
66,67 50,00 20,00 70,83 61,54 50,00 55,10 
Number since the implementation of RADP, has 
your diet change? 
     
  
Yes 
6 9 2 11 8 10 46 
% of respondents to question/effective 
beneficiaries of RADP 
85,71 42,86 66,67 47,83 72,73 76,92 58,97 
% of total interviewees 
66,67 40,91 20,00 45,83 61,54 50,00 46,94 
 
As such: 
- Market access: 47% of the respondents effective benefitting from RADP funds (i.e. 39% of 
all respondents) confirmed that their access to markets had improved as a result of RADP. 
Although a significant improvement, together with the fact that most RADP stakeholders 
stated that RADP had not yet produced commercial farmers, indicates slow progress towards 
commercialisation of RADP farms. 
- Economic situation: The proportion of all farmers interviewed indicating an improvement in 
their economic situation is 57%, representing 72% of all farmers benefiting effectively from 
RADP. This is the highest proportion of all percentages of farmers who indicated that they 
had benefited from RADP. Therefore, RADP’s greatest impact seems to have been economic. 
However, RADP’s economic impact seems to have been lower in Free State and Gauteng. 
- Social status: RADP had a relatively large impact on the social status of farmers – about 55% 
of all farmers interviewed indicated that their social status improved due to RADP. Of all 
farmers who benefited from RADP, 70% of them indicated that they had benefited from 
RADP through its impact on their social status. This is not surprising because, through the 
significant amount of funds injected into the projects, farmers benefit materially (e.g. 
acquisition of bakkies, etc.). 
- Food security and diet: About 47% of all farmers interviewed noted that RADP had impacted 
positively on their diet (mainly in the quantity, but also the quality and diversification of their 
diet). This represents about 59% of all farmers who indicated that RADP benefited them in 
one way or another. Important to note here is that it is not clear whether beneficiaries’ food 
security has improved through food production or through increased food purchased related to 
the subsidies received. 
• Questionable empowerment 
Although the results seem relatively positive, they have to be analyzed in a broader context of 
farmer empowerment.  
As such, only 34% of all farmers interviewed indicated that they had benefited from RADP 
through skills transfer. This represents about 44% of all farmers who benefited from RADP. 
These figures are the lowest of all percentages of RADP farmers benefiting in various ways from 
RADP, suggesting that RADP has performed poorly in terms of skills transfer. This is 
particularly the case in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and North West. In addition, of those who have 
benefitted from skills transfer and other support services in the framework of RADP or their 
interaction with the strategic partner/mentor, overall satisfaction is mediocre (Table 6). 
Table 6: Beneficiaries’ satisfaction level regarding mentor/strategic partners’ role (in 
percentage)  
 Eastern Cape 
Free 
State Gauteng KZN Limpopo 
North-
West Total 
Funding 
 100 0 100 80 100 -  76,00 
Providing technical 
expertise 100 30,77 100 42 50 75 66,24  
Farm management 
 100 50 100 75 50 50  70,83 
Provide output markets 
 100 66,67 100 75 100 -  88,33 
Providing input markets 
 - 0 100 88 - -  62,50 
Other skills (monitoring, 
…) 0 16,67 - 57 - 28,57 25,59  
Overall satisfaction 
 80,00 27,35 100,00 69,00 75,00 51,19  67,15 
*Empty boxes mean that that particular role was not present for this specific province – so no satisfaction rate was given. 
Provincial or business model (mentor vs strategic partnership) differences in the level of 
satisfaction are evident, especially regarding technical and managerial skills transfer. 
Beneficiaries – particularly in the Free State with a high level of strategic partnership models - 
seem to have the lowest level of satisfaction with regard to technical skills transfer and 
management training, scoring only 30% and 50%, respectively. These results reflect the 
dissatisfaction of beneficiaries with the dominant role played by mentors and strategic partners 
(i.e. total transfer of decision making and management to strategic partners/mentors). In many 
instances, the development of entrepreneurial skills is limited because farmers have very little 
decision making power and little control over production. 
 
In these cases, in the framework of the RADP, effective empowerment – which is reflected in 
effective skills transfer as well as enabling, facilitating and capacitating decision the decision 
making (with regards the design of the project, the activities, the funds, …) is questioned as, for 
the large part of the projects (36%), transferred to the strategic partner/mentor,. In these cases, as 
imposed by the DRDLR, benefiting from RADP funding goes along with the acceptance of a 
transfer of significant decision making power to mentors, questioning the core of the RADP core 
objectives related to empowerment (Lahiff, 2011). Pushing the reflection further, such decision-
making power transfers questions the status of the farmers/beneficiaries, which become 
powerless elements within broader, sometimes corporate entities (particularly in the framework 
of strategic partnerships) (Anseeuw and Ducastel, 2012). 
 
• A model that lacks broader development and employment implications 
Beyond very few beneficiaries (which is related to the RADP commercial farm development 
priority), RADP lacks broader development and employment orientations. 
Indeed the farm activities implemented, frequently proposed and closely managed by the mentor 
and strategic partner/mentor, are not focusing on labour creation. Only in 57% of the projects 
that benefitted from RADP (43% of all interviewees), it led to labout creation (Table 7). 
Table 7: Projects where RADP led to labour creation 
 
Eastern 
Cape 
Free 
State Gauteng KZN Limpopo 
North-
West Total 
N – Improved employment 
6 7 2 14 5 8 42 
% of respondents to question/effective 
beneficiaries of RADP 
85,71 33,33 100,00 66,67 50,00 66,67 57,53 
% of total interviewees 
66,67 31,82 20,00 58,33 38,46 40,00 42,86 
 
In total 540 jobs have been created through RADP. These are mainly part-time jobs: 111 full-
time and 429 part-time jobs. This represents an increase of 53% with regards the previous 
employment patterns on these farms. On average, RADP has added 4.51 jobs (1 Full-time and 4 
part-time) per project, increasing the number of jobs from 10.40 to 15.91 on average per project 
(Table 8). Although a positive outcome, it remains low (particular in relation to the amounts of 
RADP funding spent – see hereafter). Beyond many projects not being fully functional, the type 
of projects (for ex – several poultry projects) related to the development models often imposed 
(commercial agriculture related to strategic partnerships) are main reasons for the deficiency in 
job creation. 
Table 8: Employment creation through RADP 
 
N full-time 
employment 
N part-time 
employment N total 
Average full-
time 
employment 
per project 
Average part-
time 
employment 
per project 
Average total 
employment 
per project 
Before RADP 565 454 1019 5,77 4,63 10,40 
After RADP 676 883 1559 6,90 9,01 15,91 
Difference N 111 429 540 +1,13 +4,38 +4,51 
Difference % +19,65 +94,49 +52,99 +19,58 +94,60 +52,98 
 
In addition, RADP has not – or little - created jobs or leveraged development dynamics in the 
beneficiary communities. The few jobs created as well as procurement practices whereby basic 
inputs and skills were sourced from companies located outside the local community and even 
outside the specific province (often related to the network of the strategic partner) did not imply 
a snowball effect in local communities. 
 
• The huge cost of the RADP model 
 
The average funding disbursed through RADP per project is R3.56 million (i.e. only for the 
projects that received funding). This is about 37% lower than the total amount requested per 
project in the framework of RADP. The difference per province is significant: R1.067 million 
per project on average in the Eastern Cape; R6.21 million per project on average for the Free 
State. The maximum funds disbursed per project in the framework of RADP are worth noting. 
They vary from R3 million in Eastern Cape to R33 million in the Free State, averaging to R17 
million overall (Table 9). 
Table 9: Funds received in the framework of RADP per province 
 
Eastern 
Cape 
Free 
State Gauteng KZN Limpopo 
North-
West Total 
N 3 11 4 15 7 8 48 
Average per project in Province 
R1 066 
666 
R6 209 
231 
R1 666 
667 
R1 608 
529 
R1 383 
300 
R1 613 
333 
R2 371 
042 
Average per receiving project in 
Province 
R2 133 
333 
R7 338 
182 
R3 750 
000 
R2 037 
471 
R1 976 
143 
R3 025 
000 
R3 556 
563 
St. Deviation 
R1 379 
371 
R9 549 
033 
R3 233 
806 
R2 087 
883 
R1 499 
385 
R2 099 
274 
R4 722 
406 
Min 
 R0 R0 R0 R0 R0 R0 R0 
Max 
R3 200 
000 
R33 200 
000 
R10 000 
000 
R7 500 
000 
R3 600 
000 
R7 500 
000 
R33 200 
000 
Sum/Total 
R6 400 
000 
R80 720 
000 
R15 000 
000 
R30 562 
059 
R13 833 
000 
R24 200 
000 
R170 715 
059 
Projects ‘RADPed’, but not 
received funds  3 2 5 4 3 7 24 
No answer/not applicable 3 11 1 5 3 5 26 
 
The efficiency of the RADP programme, measured in terms of investment expenditure against 
results, is thus overall rather low. This is the case when the spending per project – and particular 
per sustainable project - is considered, but also when assessed per beneficiary and per job 
created. On average for the six provinces included in the study, R3.56 million is thus spent per 
project (considering that only 70% of the RADP projects were productive at the time of the 
evaluation, with a few of these projects being sustainable as yet), R520,000 is spent per 
beneficiary or R645,000 is spent per job created. 
Conclusion 
 
Is South Africa engaged in “right track land reform”? Positive results are surely present, in 
particular regarding the socio-economic and production aspects; less positive outcomes relate 
more to empowerment and skills transfer aspects. Strengths and weaknesses can be listed as 
follows: 
 
Strengths of RADP: 
• RADP has a long-term view and the farming model is comprehensive focusing on 
the development the farm as a whole. 
• Farmers are paired with experienced and well qualified industry players, which 
ensures agricultural activities to take place on the farm. 
• RADP provides the necessary infrastructure and equipment for sustainable commercial 
production. Access to farm inputs ensures that farms are back into production. 
• There is transfer of skills even though it has been minimal. 
• RADP has improved access to farm inputs through discounted inputs resulting 
from bulk-buying by strategic partners. 
• Immediate impact of projects can be realised through outputs 
• Previous land reform processes had more beneficiaries on the farm. RADP has 
fewer beneficiaries, making land and farm enterprises more viable. 
• To a larger extent, RADP has restored/improved the confidence of beneficiaries. 
• RADP brings DRDLR closer to the farmers and industry players through the 
tripartite agreements. 
 
On the other hand, weaknesses of RADP are: 
• In terms in the current funding model and lack of clarity of distressed farms, the 
programme target of 1807 farms by 2014 is not realistic. 
• Insufficient budget, particularly per province. 
• Insufficient capacity to implement and monitor the programme. 
• RADP project cycle not aligned to farming operations. 
• Poor strategic partner/mentor-beneficiary relationship. 
• Weak market linkages. 
• Limited employment generating capacity. 
• Limited understanding of RADP. 
• Limited skills transfer. 
• Strategic interventions not achieving intended objectives of RADP.  
• Selection criteria not tight enough to exclude non-deserving participants. 
• Strategic partners/mentors allocated too many projects to handle. 
• Poor screening of business plans.  
• Lack of a clear exit strategy in relation to different farming enterprises 
• The grant funding approach has encouraged overcapitalisation and lack of personal 
commitment 
• Poor selection criteria have resulted in the selection and funding of undeserving 
farmers. 
• RADP is implemented in isolation from other government departments (e.g. 
Agriculture). 
 
Broader reflections remain necessary. 
 
Firstly, a reflection on the outcomes is necessary. What development for which results is and for 
whom is RADP focusing on? This mid-term evaluation makes such a reflection possible as first 
outcomes and tendencies become observable. The results seem to show that a certain type of 
agricultural development, i.e. large-scale commercial faming, based on significant capitalisation, 
which is often externally led - sometimes by corporate structures – is developing. From the 
results, it is clear that RADP made progress (although still premature in most of the cases) with 
regards the establishment of commercial entities. However, because of the transfer of decision 
making power, the little spin-off developments, the few beneficiaries reached and the low labour 
creation, it is also clear that RADP broader results remain very limited.  
 
In addition, the State objective of “graduating small farmers into commercial farmers” smacks of 
some ignorance on the part of the programme design. Most of the farms in question here are 
independent commercial farming units that used to be farmed as family farms to its fullest 
commercial potential. These farms are all of substantial sizes and are in any case much larger 
than any smallholding in the former homeland areas. The challenge is thus not to graduate small 
scale farmers to commercial farmers but rather to “graduate” the new occupants/owners of the 
farm to a position where they can farm independently on a commercial viable scale. Providing 
the necessary financial means and farming as well as management skills are aspects necessary 
for this graduation process. 
 
Lastly, from a national policy perspective, of great concern is the fact that the RADP programme 
has basically been introduced to deal with the lack of formal agricultural support to land reform 
beneficiaries which should have been provided by provincial departments of agriculture. None of 
these support systems kicked in in a timely fashion at the transfer of land to beneficiaries. As a 
result RADP is duplicating failed efforts from agriculture departments resulting in an extra drain 
on the state fiscus which should be a major point of concern for Treasury. 
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